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Constructivism, Constitutionalism and EU’s AFSJ post-Lisbon 
Maria O’Neill* (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee)  
 
Abstract 
This essay addresses the fundamental conceptual challenges which face the development of 
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) in the post-Lisbon Treaty era. It argues that 
Onuf style constructivism is a valid lens with which to examine the development of the AFSJ 
to date, involving as it does the development of a shared understanding by practitioners, 
predominantly law enforcement and prosecution professionals, within the structures provided 
for them, in order to develop a completely new area of law and practice. While this approach 
will continue to need to be deployed in the development of further new operational areas, 
such as cybercrime, a new approach is now required, that of constitutionalism. A variety of 
forms of constitutionalism are then examined in order to establish their suitability as a mode 
of analysis for these developments.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
It is the argument of this paper that the approach of the former Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) policy area, that of constructivism, has served us 
well during its construction phase, but it is now time, or even beyond time, that a 
constitutionalist approach is taken to the development of its corpus juris. Equally, the 
constitutionalist approach being advocated by many legal academics, particularly when it 
comes to former PJCCM measures, needs to acknowledge the Treaty based limitations to its 
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development, and the need for an ongoing reflexive relationship between constitutionalism 
and constructivism, going forward.  
 
This author would be of the view that constructivism, particularly following Onuf,1 
with its approach to the construction of understandings in transnational settings where agents, 
such as justice and law enforcement personnel, and structures, interact with each other in the 
development of that understanding, is key to understanding the development of the former 
PJCCM policy area to date. This will be an approach which will be called upon again in the 
future in addressing emerging challenges to the EU’s internal security.  
 
With the post Lisbon legal framework coming fully into force after the expiration of 
the five year phase in period of the Lisbon Treaty, it is important to review the perspectives 
that have been brought to the development of law and practice in this area. The former 
PJCCM pillar, which includes not only justice provisions but also cross-border law 
enforcement, and the particularly sensitive issue of counter-terrorism, has undergone the most 
radical changes under the Lisbon Treaty. The pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar, which was 
intergovernmental in nature, is currently part of the unitary supranational post-Lisbon EU 
legal framework, subject to the well-recognised principles of supremacy and direct effect. 
While the legal nature of the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar threw up its own issues when it came 
to enacting laws and policies, it is noticeable that its security provisions are much more 
highly developed than the anticipated corresponding freedom and justice provisions. It is 
arguable that this is as a consequence of the constructivist approach taken by both policy 
makers and law enforcement practitioners in the pre-Lisbon era, at the expense of the then 
                                                          
1 N. Onuf, World of Our Making, (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989). 
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lacking constitutionalist approach, which is (better) facilitated post-Lisbon both by the 
increasing engagement of the justice professionals in the process, and by the changed legal 
structure of this policy area post-Lisbon. The former third pillar PJCCM has been re-
integrated with the pre-Lisbon first pillar provisions on Visas, Asylum and Immigration, 
forming the new Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The Council, the driver of the 
pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar, has been joined by the Commission and the European Parliament 
as the engines for development, with the ordinary legislative procedure having been adopted 
for most of the post-Lisbon AFSJ. This will also be relevant in rebalancing the freedom and 
justice provisions with the reasonably well developed security provisions of the AFSJ. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty changes to the EU’s AFSJ legal framework require the above 
analysis. The transfer of the PJCCM policy area from the third pillar to the new unitary 
structure has embedded the principles of supremacy and direct effect into this area of law. In 
addition the new role of the Court of Justice of the EU (in the AFSJ, with its almost full 
review powers after the now expired five year phase in period of the Lisbon Treaty (post 
December 2014),2 together with the upgrade in legal status of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) 2000, which is now fully judiciable, and the intended accession of the EU to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), despite the recent ruling of the Court of 
Justice in Opinion 2/13,3 have all improved the prospect for a constitutional analysis of this 
area of law.  
 
                                                          
2 After the expiry of the five year phase in period of the Lisbon Treaty, pursuant to Protocol no. (No 36) on 
Transitional Provisions. 
3 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court), 18 December 2014, OJ C 65, 23/02/2015 p.2. 
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Current academic legal debate is focusing on analysing the EU through the lens of 
constitutionalism. This analysis, however, needs to recognise issues of attribution and 
sovereignty, together with Treaty based red lines, particularly in the context of the security 
provisions in the former PJCCM policy area. These are in particular Article 4.2 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides that the EU “shall respect 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security 
remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” Article 72 TFEU goes on to provide 
that it is up to individual Member States to deal with their own law and order issues, and to 
safeguard their own internal security. Article 73 TFEU provides that transnational aspects of 
an otherwise undefined “national security” are a matter for Member States to organise 
between themselves, and therefore, not a matter for the EU to lead on. Some of the security 
provisions, in particular the placing of police officers across borders, remain subject to the 
special legislative procedure,4 thereby retaining control in the hands of the Interior/ Home 
Office Ministers in the Council. The AFSJ is additionally a matter of shared competence 
between the EU and its Member States,5 and therefore subject to the principle of subsidiarity. 
In addition the AFSJ is subject to a variety of opt in and opt out provisions, applicable to 
individual Member States. The evolving constitutionalism argument being used for the post-
Lisbon AFSJ needs to acknowledge these limitations in the EU competence in order to 
maintain its relevance.  
 
In addition to the above changes within the EU level of governance, the interaction of 
the legal frameworks at the different levels of governance will also pose challenges. As Dine 
                                                          
4 Article 87.3 TFEU. 
5 Article 4.2.j TFEU. 
6 
 
has pointed out, when writing in the pre-Lisbon era, the “relationship between national 
criminal law, EU criminal provisions, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the impact of the Charter [is] likely to fuel a highly complex debate.”6 The 
anticipated complex debate, and the search for workable solutions, has now begun. The 
question arises as to how best to conceptualise these developments, in order to better 
understand the underlying legal dynamic and anticipate and direct its future development. 
 
Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is a tool of analysis developed in the 1990s, emerging from 
International Relations theory, but is increasingly being used in legal analysis. Located 
between rationalists and interpretivists, constructivists examined not so much objects, but the 
meaning that was attributed to those objects, with social constructs or understandings 
informing how meaning is so attributed.7 Constructivism, which has been classified as “an 
approach to social inquiry”, is based on two premises, “the environment in which agents take 
action is social as well as material” and that the setting which provides the actors “with 
understandings of their interests ([it] “constitutes” them).”8 There is therefore “a process of 
interaction” between the structures and the individuals which are operating within those 
                                                          
6 J. Dine, “Criminal Law and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,” in S. Peers and A. Ward (eds.) The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights Politics, Law and Policy, Essays in European Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2004), p.270. 
7 J. Cristol, Constructivism, Oxford Bibliographies (online). 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0061.xml.  
8 J. Jupille, J.A. Caporaso, J.T. Checkel, Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of 
the European Union, Comparative Political Studies 2003 36: 7, 14. 
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structures.9 As constructivism was developed in the field of International Relations it 
examined the meanings that societies, or states, attributed to international treaties or other 
arrangements. Much of the academic discourse to date focusing on constructivism in the EU 
has focused on the EU-Member State relationship, missing much of the detail involved in the 
construction of completely new areas of operation, such as transnational law enforcement, to 
include counter-terrorism, where the individual has had a major impact in designing what 
were essentially ground up initiatives, which only later were adopted by the Member States, 
and legislated for in a top down fashion.  
 
Onuf developed a strand of constructivism which advocated that “constructivism is a 
universal experience”10 and one that we cannot avoid, as we are located within one type of 
society or another. Therefore Onuf’s constructivism applies “not simply to the level of states, 
but to humans in any dimension of their social activity, international relations being merely 
one, albeit an extremely important one, among many”.11 Whether this mutual construction of 
understanding has happened at the level of either the individual, following Onuf’s approach,12 
or the institution, both are highly relevant in the construction of a completely new law and 
practice framework for cross-border law enforcement.  
 
Cardwell, writing from a legal perspective has stated that “constructivists claim that 
social realities only exist by human agreement through intersubjective understanding, and are 
                                                          
9 Above, p.14.  
10 V. Kubáklová, “The Twenty Years’ Catharsis: E.H. Carr and IR” in V. Kubáklová, N. Onuf and P. Kowert, 
(eds), International Relations in a Constructed World. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.72. 
11 Above. 
12 Above. 
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therefore susceptible to change.”13 In areas where there was no pre-existing legal and practice 
framework, such as in former  PJCCM matters, when practitioners were asked to build a new 
legal and practice jurisdiction they necessarily brought their own socialised understandings of 
how to, for example, conduct law enforcement operations, and through interaction with their 
counterparts from other jurisdictions, negotiate a shared understanding as to how a 
transnational law enforcement operation was to work. It is the human being at the interface 
between the relevant jurisdictions who has “constructed”, with his counterparts, a new social 
reality. The activities of the Police Working Group on Terrorism and TREVI were cases in 
point, as was the original construction of the Europol Drugs Unit, which started operating 
before its underpinning legislation was enacted, and which eventually developed into today’s 
Europol. The susceptibility to change,14 however, referred to in the above quote from 
Cardwell, is a key issue when it comes to the issue of fundamental and human rights, 
particularly in the context of justice and law enforcement, to include counter-terrorism. The 
traditional constructivist approach to the development of EU law enforcement and security 
strategies is now encountering an increasing constitutionalism within the EU legal 
framework, highlighting significant legal tensions. Less constructivist, and more grounded in 
individual Member States norms, has been judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Judicial 
co-operation, and justice issues generally, have lagged behind the development of cross 
border law enforcement provisions, leading to the acknowledged imbalance between the 
security, justice and freedom elements of the AFSJ, which now needs to be addressed. 
However a constructivist approach can be also traced through these developments, with 
                                                          
13 P.J. Cardwell, EU External Relations and System of Governance The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
and Migration, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 75. 
14 Above, p.5. 
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Walker and Tierney referring to “the infiltration of criminal law into the European 
transnational constitutional mosaic” as being “gradual and ‘bottom up’.”15  
 
Constructivism as an approach can also be traced in areas where one would expect 
constitutional norms to be the defining discourse, such as in the context of mutual meaning 
making at the highest judicial level. For example, references can be taken from other courts 
to explain how law is created in a transnational/ international setting. Lord Neuberger, 
currently president of the UK Supreme Court, one of the persons best placed to address the 
issue of how judges work, in a speech given in Australia in 2014,16 has referred to the UK 
Supreme Court engaging “in dialogue, in the form of giving a detailed judgment” with the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.17 He also speaks about UK Supreme Court 
being “successful in getting Strasbourg to change its mind”.18 He goes on to say that “the 
development of pan-European law after centuries, indeed millennia, of separate development 
and frequent wars, and with different political and legal traditions, and different historical 
experiences and different traditions, was never going to be easy.”19 All of these points are 
equally applicable to the UK, and other Member State’s Supreme and Constitutional Courts’ 
relationship with the Court of Justice, the well analysed spat between the then European 
                                                          
15 N. Walker and S. Tierney, “Introduction”, in N. Walker and S. Tierney (eds.) A Constitutional Mosaic? 
Exploring the New Frontiers of Europe’s Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p.17. 
16 Lord Neuberger at a conference at the Supreme Court of Victoria, Melbourne, The role of judges in human 
rights jurisprudence: a comparison of the Australian and UK experience, 8 August 2014, available at 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140808.pdf. 
17 Above, paragraph 34.  
18 Above, paragraph 34.  
19 Above, paragraph 43.  
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Court of Justice (ECJ) and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht following the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft line of cases in the 1970s and 80’s being a case in point.20  
 
As stated by Wiener, “the context in which norms evolve matters in a significant 
way”.21 The creation and development of a shared identity is the key to the development of 
these norms. While EU Member States have developed a shared understanding of the role of 
“the rule of law, democracy and fundamental freedoms and human rights”,22 the EU Member 
State law enforcement communities, in particular, being task orientated, have, at least at the 
transnational level, developed a shared understanding of the tasks to be undertaken, and a 
shared identity and community, negotiating their own Member States structural and 
operational differences in order to achieve their objectives. Member States prosecutors and 
judges are also adjusting to these developments, with “interaction .. taking place within the 
legal realm”,23 with a number of transnational norms being adopted into the legal structures, 
such as the effect that can be clearly seen of the recent directive on trafficking of human 
                                                          
20 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittle (Case 11/70) 
[1970] ECR 1125, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel (Case 2 B. V L 52/71) C.M.L. Rep. 1974 Vol 2, p. 540, Re the Application of Wünsche 
Handelsgesellschaft (Case 2 B.v. R 197/83) and Hoechst v Commission (Case 46/87) [1989] ECR 2859. 
21 A. Wiener, Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics, European 
Journal of International Relations (2004) 10: 189, 195. 
22 Above, p.195.  
23 Above, p.197.  
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beings,24 a process that Wiener refers to as “interaction, interpretation, internalization.”25 She 
goes on to hypothesize that legal rules are “embedded in a set of beliefs which is created 
through the rule of law as a social practice”, a process which should lead to high levels of 
compliance with those laws.26 
 
Constitutionalism 
 
In contrast to constructivism, constitutionalism has a longer, and varied, pedigree. 
There are many schools of thought housed under the umbrella term, “constitutionalism”, with 
the European Court of Justice having previously characterised the commercially focused EC 
Treaty as being of a “constitutional character”, in Partie Ecologiste “Les Verts”,27 and being 
of “constitutional character” in Opinion 1/91.28 In contrast, however, to the law and practice 
deriving from the old EC pillar, the AFSJ “raises important challenges for human rights”,29 in 
                                                          
24 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15/04/2011 p. 1. 
25 Wiener, above, p.197.  
26 Above, p.197.  
27 Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament (Case 294/83) [1986] ECR 1339, para 23 of the 
judgment. 
28 Opinion 1/9, Draft Agreement relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, [1991] ECR I-6079, 
6102, para. 21. 
29 S. Douglas Scott, “Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic: Human Rights and the European Legal Space – Utopia, 
Dystopia, Monotopia or Polytopia?”, in N. Walker and S. Tierney (eds.) A Constitutional Mosaic? Exploring the 
New Frontiers of Europe’s Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p.123. 
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particular given the operation of the European Arrest Warrant,30 the European Investigation 
Order,31 the various cross border intelligence sharing and analysis provisions, and the various 
provisions on the transfer of prisoners. These all need greater clarity to be developed in the 
constitutional character of what is now the post-Lisbon Treaty framework, for law 
enforcement in general, and counter-terrorism in particular. 
 
The development of a constitutionalism approach in the AFSJ, however, requires 
further clarification. As Shaw has argued, “constitutionalism … is troubling to the EU”,32 
particularly in light of the failure of the “Draft European Constitution”, and the clear 
understanding that the EU is not heading towards a United States of Europe. Traditionally a 
Constitution is seen as comprising two to three parts, the first “the structure composition, 
functions and other inter-relationships of the principal organs of state”,33 secondly, 
fundamental rights, which although “these rights may be invoked against a private individual, 
in fact .. they are [usually] opposed to some organ” of the state.34 The third element, which 
may or may not be present, is a statement of “national beliefs, ideals and aspirations”.35 The 
first two of these elements are clearly set out at an EU level, with the EC and EU treaties 
historically, and Treaty on European Union (TEU) and TFEU more recently, setting out the 
                                                          
30 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant, OJ L 190, 18/07/2002 pp. 1 – 
20. 
31 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 01/05/2014 p. 1. 
32 J. Shaw, Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy (1999) 6:4 
Special Issue: 579-97, 582.  
33 D.G. Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland, (Dublin: The Round Hall Press, 1985), p.11. 
34 Above. 
35 Above. p.12.  
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structure, composition, function and inter-relationships of the organs of the EU, and their 
interaction with individual EU Member States. More recently, in particular post-Lisbon, the 
fundamental rights of the individual, in particular vis á vis the organs of the EU, have been 
set out in the EU CFR, and the role of the ECHR has been concretised in EU law in the 
proposed accession of the EU to the ECHR. Although based in secondary law rather than in 
primary law, the development of the Procedural Rights road map36 can also be added to this 
mix.   
 
The Procedural Rights road map37 has been drafted, with a number of its proposals 
already in force. At the time of writing there is a directive in place giving the right to 
translation and interpretation services,38 and a proposed directive on the right to access to a 
lawyer in criminal proceedings, and the right to communicate with one on arrest.39 The right 
to legal aid in cross border civil and commercial matters40 has already been recognised. It can 
be expected that one will follow for criminal matters. Some of the procedural rights of 
                                                          
36 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, and incorporated in the Stockholm Action Plan, COM 
(2010) 171 of 20.04.2010. 
37 Above.  
38 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ L 280, 26/10/2010, p.1. 
39 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of access to a lawyer in 
criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon arrest, COM(2011) 326. 
40 Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by 
establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, OJ L 26, 31/01/2003, p.41. 
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individuals, in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, are already provided for.41 
Current proposals for legislation of relevance to the investigation/ pre-trial proceedings 
include a green paper on the ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) principle,42 a green paper on 
procedural safeguards for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings,43 and what was a 
proposal for a Council Framework decision on procedural rights.44 This latter document will 
probably re-emerge as a proposed directive, post-Lisbon. There is also some work on-going 
on “the feasibility of an index of third-country nationals convicted in the European Union”.45 
Other provisions at, and post-conviction, are also in the pipeline. The recent directive on 
victims’ rights46 is also likely to have a profound effect. Other EU case law will prove useful 
in filling in some of the gaps in the only partially enacted road map on procedural rights. 
Lenaerts has undertaken a study of pre-existing rights under the then ECJ case law which 
                                                          
41 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the 
procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions 
rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ L 81, 27/03/2009, p.24. 
42 Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in criminal proceedings, COM 
(2005) 696 final. 
43 Green paper form the Commission, Procedural Safeguard for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the European Union, COM (2003) 75. 
44 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout 
the European Union, COM (2004) 328 final.  
45 Commission working document on the feasibility of an index of third-country nationals convicted in the 
European Union, COM (2006) 359 final. 
46 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315/57. 
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could be used.47 As Herlin-Karnell has pointed out, the principle of legality and 
proportionality of criminal offences and penalties, while “codified in Article 49 of the 
Charter”,48 has already appeared in a number of pre-Lisbon cases, such as Pupino.49 She has 
said that “the issue is far more complicated when dealing with procedural legality in the 
context of criminal law cooperation,”50 expressing concern over the high level of 
development of the EU’s security provisions in comparison to its freedom and justice 
provisions.  
 
Some may argue that the failure of the Draft Constitutional Treaty means that the EU 
operates in a non-Constitutional way. The term “Constitution” in political and legal matters 
has two different uses, one is in a “wide and abstract sense” referring to a “system of laws, 
customs and conventions which create and validate the organs of government and which 
regulate the interaction of those organs with one another and with the individual”,51 much as 
the UK Constitution has traditionally been referred to. In a more “narrow and concrete sense” 
the term “Constitution” also refers to “the document or documents in which the basic legal 
rules of the constitution are authoritatively declared”.52 While the EU may well lack a 
document labelled “Constitution”, it clearly has a “document or documents” which set out 
                                                          
47 K. Lenaerts, The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, (2010), I.C.L.Q., 59(2), 255-301. 
48 E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional dimension of European Criminal Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. 
2012), p.54. 
49 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino (Case C-105/03) [2005] ECR 2005 p. I-05285. 
50 Herlin-Karnell, above, p.38.  
51 B. Doolan, Constitutional Law and its Constitutional Rights in Ireland, 3rd edn, (Dublin: Gill & Macmilan 
Ltd. 1994), p.1. 
52 Above. 
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rights which may be invoked both against other private individuals and against organs of the 
EU “state”. The role of a senior court, normally a Supreme Court or Constitutional Court in 
protecting those individual rights, can be seen reflected in the approach of the Court of 
Justice to these “Constitutional documents” of the EU, even if the Court also has other roles 
to perform in the EU legal structure. Equally, if there is a perception of a lack of clear “static 
legal hierarchies”, as is often seen in the legal relationships between Member States courts, 
between the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, it is possible to use 
the conception of “constitutionalism in term[s] of a process”.53  
 
This lack of static legal hierarchies between Member States Constitutional courts with 
both the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice has been analysed by 
academics. Academics have been pointing out that the automatic supremacy of European 
Court of Human Rights law, for example, is not guaranteed within EU Member States, in the 
same way as EU law is recognised as being supreme,54 with the EU institutions, to include 
the Court, being “given a mandate to unify the laws of Europe.”55 No such mandate was 
given to the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights.56 While 
Constitutional courts do make efforts to accommodate EU law into national law, there are 
however, occasional problems with the supremacy of EU law at the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
53 C. Mac Amhlaigh, “The European Union’s Constitutional Mosaic: Big “C” or small “c”, Is that the 
Question?,” in N. Walker and S. Tierney (eds.) A Constitutional Mosaic? Exploring the New Frontiers of 
Europe’s Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), p.28. 
54 G. Martinico and O. Pollicino, The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems; Judicial Dialogue and the 
Creation of Supranational Laws, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2010). 
55 G. Martinico, Is the European Convention going to be "supreme"? A comparative-constitutional overview of 
ECHR and EU law before national courts, (2012) European Journal of International Law, 402. 
56 Above, p. 402. 
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level of the EU Member States. The lack of hierarchical clarity is likely to continue between 
the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights post EU accession to the 
ECHR. In addition, there appears already to be “a partial convergence in the application of 
EU and ECHR’s norms”, independent of the actual accession of the EU to the ECHR.57 The 
actual accession has now been deferred, with the Court of Justice in Opinion 2/13 ruling that 
the draft placed before it for consideration was in breach of Article 6(2) TEU, as it affected 
“the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties”, and Protocol no 8.58  
At the Court of Justice/European Court of Human Rights level Martinico and 
Pollicino have developed the “impression that we are dealing with a sort of cooperative 
climate between judges,” particularly with the aim of protecting fundamental rights.59 They 
also point out that “[m]any fundamental judgments of the ECJ are [already] very rich in 
references to the judgments of the ECtHR or to the provisions of the ECHR”.60 This analysis 
of a cooperative climate in the context of fundamental rights is likely to also be relevant in 
the context of these courts relationships with the Constitutional/ Supreme Courts of 
individual Member States.  
 
Constitutionalism is clearly forming part of the developing EU, through the role of the 
Court of Justice in interpreting treaties and similar documents, which may or may not be 
regarded as the “Constitutional documents” of the EU. However the new legal framework of 
the EU post Lisbon requires the further development of this approach, constitutionalism, to 
dovetail with the pre-existing constructivist approach, which has far from run its course. In 
                                                          
57 Above, p.402.  
58 Opinion 2/13, ruling of the CJEU, paragraph 258. 
59 Martinico and Pollicino, above, p.16.  
60 Above, p.7.  
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the context of the AFSJ, Gibbs has stated that constitutionalism sets “the challenge to 
consider … relational ways of living as a political community”, rather than “seeking a stable, 
or fixed, definition of constitutionalism”.61 This is clearly a challenge for the developing EU, 
particularly in the context of the AFSJ, many of its themes going to the core of political life, 
and the construction of the societies of the EU’s Member States. However, as pointed out by 
Jupille et. al, the EU’s “identity as a political system [is] problematic”.62 
 
As Gibbs, writing during the early stages of the development of the AFSJ, pointed out 
that there is an “apparent paradox between the [then] depth of integration” at the EU level, 
which “presupposes a common political way of life in the EU”, which may well appear in 
broad brush strokes, but can be quite different when individual Member States are examined 
in detail, and “concerns about how to understand such a political community”, particularly 
leading to concerns “over the constitutional legitimacy of that which is taking place”.63 The 
same can still be said today. Equally, if the EU is in fact a political community, the issue 
arises as to who comprises the community, and if it is meant to be the citizens of the different 
EU Member States, where and how are those citizens’ rights clearly expressed and 
implemented. Principles which underpin individual Member States of the EU, to include the 
balance between the state and the individual in the context of law enforcement and counter-
terrorism, have been shaped over centuries, perhaps as a result of political upheaval, war or 
other hard fought fights between the state and the individual, or between different social 
groups within states. Such principles will not be easily compromised. There is a need for us 
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to examine the “legitimate basis, or foundation”,64 not only of the shift itself from the 
Member States to the EU of the deliberation of these issues, but also the nature of the 
principles subsequently developed at the EU level, and the balance between the supra-
national EU and the individual.  
 
It must be recognised that the EU is only operating “within the powers granted to it by 
the Member States”,65 as expressly provided for post Lisbon in Article 4.1 TEU, with the 
principle of conferral applying, as set out in Article 5 TEU. In addition there have been clear 
examples of excluding “certain fields of action from Union competence” which has been 
“particularly prevalent in the field of security”.66 In particular, in the AFSJ, as discussed 
above, the EU has clearly limited competence to engage in issues which are central to 
individual Member State sovereignty and identity, such as national security,67 which has yet 
to be defined,68 and the maintenance of internal security of individual Member States.69 In 
addition, as discussed above, the balance of the activities of the AFSJ are subject to the 
principle of subsidiarity,70 further limiting the activities of the EU, and the Court of Justice in 
these areas. An issue arises then whether a clear boundary can be established between EU law 
and Member State law in AFSJ matters, or whether that boundary, will, in practice, be fluid. 
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Nevertheless, there is a need for the EU to establish its values in the area of criminal law and 
cross border law enforcement, to include counter-terrorism, given that it is active in this area. 
As Nuotio has stated, criminal law, “is replete with values and ideologies, which are hard to 
avoid wherever and however the field is addressed.”71 These values and ideologies are not yet 
fixed at the EU level. The basic principles of the EU, set out in particular in the EU Charter, 
but also in the ECHR and the shared Constitutional traditions of the EU Member States, still 
need to be robustly built into the EU AFSJ legal framework. Mac Amhlaigh uses an 
interesting term of constitutionalism, referring to it as “as a forum for contestation regarding 
the values of the political community, where reasonable disagreement is articulated and 
debated.”72 The term “political community” is also contested, and whether one exists at the 
EU level is also debatable. It is arguable that at the level of the EU this constitutional 
contestation and debate is only now really getting started. 
 
Onuf’s constructivist approach, of the constant making sense of the world, and 
negotiating that understanding, greatly assists the development of structures from new. A 
number of initiatives are still on the EU drawing board. However, novel threats in the on-line 
world, such as cyber-facilitated terrorism, continue to require Onuf’s constructivist approach. 
As a counter-point to technologically based threats, public disquiet at recent revelations 
dealing with mass data processing and surveillance on behalf of the security and law 
enforcement services, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism, also need to be 
addressed from a constitutionalist perspective. To the extent that EU law applies, these need 
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to be examined in light of Article 8 CFR, which covers the protection of personal data.73 
Constructivism will not assist in the protection of individual rights, which require a more 
concrete, and less fungible understanding of standards and norms. This relationship between 
the preceding constructivist model, subsequently followed by constitutionalism, in the 
rebalancing of the AFSJ between its freedom, security and justice provisions, leads to a 
reflexive relationship. The constitutionalism of standards and norms by the courts, in 
particular under the post Lisbon legal framework, may well lead to further construction of 
shared understandings of what should be covered by the EU’s AFSJ, and how it is to operate. 
Nevertheless there is a need for the constitutionalism of the AFSJ to now come to the fore. 
Some academics have already approached the AFSJ “as part of the constitutional authority of 
the EU”,74 although Gibb’s argument, writing in 2011, is that there is a “precarious” balance 
“between an instrumental and a constitutional understanding of the public goods of freedom, 
security and justice”. Some clarity now needs to be brought to this issue. 
 
 
The development of the new AFSJ legal framework 
 
The EU is in need of a constitutionalist approach to the AFSJ, as one of the most 
important aspects of constitutionalism is the “limitation of public power,”75 with a 
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constitutional approach required in order to “produce criminal law in a legitimate fashion”,76 
whatever the effect that that criminal law might have on “European constitutionality” itself.77 
The arrival at that constitutionality, at some point short of an actual Constitution, will require 
much Onuf style constructivism amongst the policy and legal communities within the EU, 
taking the plural rather than the singular approach, in light of Gibbs argument, above, about 
political community.  
 
Given the multi-level structure of governance in the EU, as it affects EU Member 
States, Krisch speaks about “the Enmeshment of Laws”.78 This then gives rise to the issue of 
how to construct and navigate what he also refers to as a “pluralist web of legal orders.79 The 
networked governance approach adopted by Krisch for developing a “bridge between 
different supremacy”80 is, however, not suitable when dealing with issues going to the core of 
fundamental rights issues, such as arrest and detention, nor is it likely that he envisaged its 
use in this way. Krisch examines constitutionalism and pluralism as competing prisms in the 
context of global integration, both assuming that there is a “clear separation between 
domestic and international law”,81 the focus of his work, rather than the supranational law of 
the EU. There is no such clear separation in the context of Member State/EU/ECHR relations, 
which lie at the core of the AFSJ debate. Krisch does however point out that pluralism 
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“remains vulnerable to exploitation in certain circumstances.” He argues that a 
“constitutionalist model [might prove to be] a stronger bulwark against abuse by the 
powerful”,82 a point taken in this paper. While the political conditions might prove very 
challenging for the development of a constitutionalist model at the global level, the 
conditions for its development within the EU, an issue which Krisch does not address 
directly, are much more favourable.  
 
Von Bogdandy, as reported by Kumm, has blended the two themes of this paper, 
constitutionalism and constructivism, suggesting “that ‘doctrinal constructivism’” “is at the 
heart of constitutional scholarship in Europe.”83 This author would regard Von Bogdandy’s 
constructivism as being narrower than the one which needs to be adopted in order to build 
understanding  in the broader societal sense of the actual development of the AFSJ by 
practitioners. As Kumm has added, it is possible that the term “doctrinal constructivism” may 
well turn out “to be a relatively capacious term.”84 Kumm also informs us that Von 
Bogdandy’s use of the term “doctrinal constructivism” is a compromise between the Anglo-
Saxon and Continental European legal traditions, with the English speaking world viewing 
law more as a craft or business, and the Continental legal systems viewing law more as a 
science.85 However law is viewed, these legal jurisdictions need to interact with each other, 
both in the context of the EU generally, and in the context of the more politically sensitive 
AFSJ in particular. These issues will have to be addressed if the EU is to effectively develop 
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and operate the AFSJ, to include the supranational EU criminal law, which will go to the core 
of the issues of human and fundamental rights through its arrest and detention provisions. As 
Nuotio states “criminal law carries certain heightened expectations of legitimacy within 
itself”,86 a challenge which the EU transnational legal system will have to address.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Walker has opened up a debate about post-national constitutionalism and post-
national public law at the international/global level.87 However, the constructivism-
constitutionalism argument can be seen in starker relief in the context of the EU with its 
supra-national legal framework, and it’s rapidly developing AFSJ, which is having a direct 
impact on how national law enforcement personnel, prosecutors and judiciary operate. Mac 
Amhlaigh’s constitutionalism in the context of “a forum for contestation” needs to be brought 
to the fore in legal academic discourse. The values of the EU political community, and its 
disagreements on justice and security issues in the context of fundamental/human and due 
process rights, need to be properly articulated and debated.88 This level of analysis is 
overdue. The issue of potential gaps in judicial oversight of cross border law enforcement and 
by extension, counter-terrorism provisions, has already been addressed by Hinarejos. She has 
stated that that any gaps would “be considered unsatisfactory” by all concerned parties, 
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pointing out that there is a need for the Court of Justice and the national courts to “strive to 
cooperate”89 in practice. They need to ensure that there is, in fact, no gap in the judicial 
oversight of cross-border law enforcement and prosecution activity. This brings us back to 
the construction of the constitutional approach. 
 
While there is still room for Onuf style constructivism in the AFSJ, this should be 
reserved to new areas of law enforcement, such as cyber-facilitated terrorism, where the 
development of a mutual understanding at the practitioner level is still required. 
Constitutionalism however, should now be the dominant theme, with both current and new 
provisions increasingly being brought within the legal framework of the CFR, and the EU’s 
other “Constitutional documents” and traditions. This will be done by the legislators, and 
should they fail to do so, by the Court of Justice. Peters is clearly of the view that the “EU is 
a constitutional and constitutionalist system on the ground that individuals enjoy 
constitutional protection against the organisation itself, and are empowered to enforce that 
protection.”90 This will increasingly be seen in the Court of Justice judgments going forward, 
now that the five year phase in period of the Lisbon Treaty has expired. As Nuotio has stated, 
there needs now to be a “‘taming’ of politics”, with the stakes in the construction of a 
transnational criminal framework being “very high”.91 There is an “ongoing transformation of 
                                                          
89 A. Hinarejos, “Law and Order and Internal Security Provisions in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
Before and After Lisbon,” in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, A European Public Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011,) p.270. 
90 A. Peters, “The Constitutionalisation of International Organisations,” in N. Walker and S. Tierney (eds.), A 
Constitutional Mosaic? Exploring the New Frontiers of Europe’s Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2011,), p.268. 
91 Nuotio, above, p.332.  
26 
 
criminal law” at the EU level. This transformation needs to take a constitutionalism approach, 
with the “full impact” of these post-Lisbon changes not yet being obvious.92  
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